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INVOLUNTARY RETURN AND
THE “FOUND IN” CLAUSE OF 8 U.S.C. § 1326(A):
AN IMMIGRATION CONUNDRUM
Matthew J. Geyer*
Illegal reentry into the United States by previously removed aliens is a
major problem that has risen steadily in recent years. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
punishes such aliens. Specifically, § 1326(a) provides for criminal fines or
imprisonment (or both) of any previously removed alien who enters,
attempts to enter, or is “found in” the United States at any time after his or
her initial removal.
What does it mean to be “found in” the United States in violation of
§ 1326(a)?
The easy case is when a previously removed alien
surreptitiously reenters the United States illegally, remains in the United
States undetected for some time, and is then physically found by U.S.
officials within the country’s borders. But, what happens when a previously
removed alien surreptitiously reenters the United States illegally and
remains undetected by U.S. officials until that alien subsequently attempts
to leave the country and is involuntarily returned to the United States by
foreign officials after physically crossing into that foreign territory?
Should these aliens be considered “found in” the United States?
The Ninth Circuit has answered this question in the affirmative twice,
while the Second Circuit has declined to consider such aliens to be “found
in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a). This Note argues that the
federal courts should adopt the Second Circuit’s holding for numerous
legal and policy reasons that are consistent with major U.S. Supreme Court
and circuit court decisions that have shaped U.S. immigration law since the
beginning of the twentieth century.
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INTRODUCTION
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521 (INA) has been described
as a “hideous creature” containing “excruciating technical provisions that
are often hopelessly intertwined.”2 Codified under Title 8 of the United
States Code,3 the INA contains many ambiguous provisions that have left
important questions relating to immigration unanswered and passionately
contested. Key among such ambiguities are provisions of the INA that
provide for criminal prosecution of previously removed aliens4 who
illegally reenter the United States.5 Illegal reentry of previously removed
aliens is a rising problem and is currently the most common federal
immigration charge in the U.S. district courts.6 In 2013 alone, the United
States commenced 23,942 actions for immigration offenses in the district
courts, with the offense of illegal reentry accounting for 20,120 (just over
84 percent) of these total actions.7 Thus, ambiguities in certain provisions
of the INA related to prosecuting these aliens are particularly concerning.

1. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
2. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 1 (5th ed. 2009).
3. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012).
4. For the purpose of consistency, this Note adopts the INA’s definition of “alien” to
mean any individual who is “not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3).
5. See Jason D. Anton, Note, Defining “Found in”: Constructive Discovery and the
Crime of Illegal Reentry, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1239, 1239–41 (2013).
6. U.S. COURTS, TABLE D-2, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
COMMENCED, BY OFFENSE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
THROUGH 2013 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/D02DSep13.pdf.
7. Id.
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One of these provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), relates specifically to
punishing previously removed aliens who illegally reenter the United
States.8 It provides in relevant part:
[A]ny alien who—(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or
removed or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion,
deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter (2) enters, attempts
to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States . . . shall be fined
under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.9

There are three ways a previously removed alien can violate the statute:
(1) by entering the United States; (2) by attempting to enter the United
States; or (3) by being “found in” the United States.10 This Note focuses on
how federal courts of appeals have applied the section’s “found in” clause
to a particular group of aliens following an unusual immigration pattern.11
There are many questions surrounding what it actually means to be
“found in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a).12 The easy case is
when a previously removed alien surreptitiously reenters the United States
illegally, remains undetected for some time, and is later physically found by
U.S. officials within the country’s borders. However, a much harder case—
one that has been adjudicated by federal courts of appeals three times since
200913—is when a previously removed alien surreptitiously reenters the
United States illegally, but remains undetected until the alien attempts to
leave the country and is involuntarily returned to the United States by
foreign officials after physically crossing into that foreign territory.
This Note focuses on the harder case: Should such aliens be considered
“found in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a), and therefore subject
to potential prison time? This issue has divided the Ninth and Second
Circuits.14 Beyond resolving the immediate conflict arising from the Ninth
and Second Circuits’ differing interpretations of the “found in” clause,
resolution of this split is important for additional reasons. First, previously
removed aliens carrying out the same actions will face different treatment
under the “found in” clause depending on the circuit in which they are
present. This produces inconsistent results for an already complex
immigration system.

8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Although this provision is also codified in the INA under
section 276, this Note refers to the provision solely as § 1326(a) for consistency.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Anton, supra note 5, at 1241.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that such
aliens are not “found in” the United States); United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d 1239,
1240–41 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that such aliens are “found in” the United States); United
States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 2009) (also holding that such aliens
are “found in” the United States); see also infra Part II.
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Second, in light of continued legislative inaction and controversial
executive action in the area of immigration reform,15 judicial action may be
the only way to address fundamental uncertainties and problems facing the
country’s immigration landscape. As noted above, illegal reentry is the
most common federal immigration charge in the U.S. district courts,16 and
the courts are in a unique position to remedy inconsistencies—like the one
addressed in this Note—where the other branches of the government have
continued to delay action.17
Lastly, the unusual immigration patterns in United States v. AmbrizAmbriz,18 United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz,19 and United States v. Macias20
pose a new kind of policy question not only for the courts but for American
society: Should the United States criminally sanction previously removed
aliens for attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to stop living in the very
country in which they are illegally present? This question drives at the very
heart of the debate between the Ninth and Second Circuits over whether
such aliens should be considered “found in” the United States in violation
of § 1326(a).
Part I of this Note explores the history of the INA and § 1326(a), and
discusses the meanings of the “enters,” “attempts to enter,” and “found in”
clauses of the statute. Part I concludes with a discussion of the “official
restraint” analysis, which can be used as a defense to a “found in” violation
under § 1326(a).21 Part II lays out the split between the Ninth and Second
Circuits by articulating the facts of each case and each circuit’s doctrinal
and policy arguments for their differing interpretations of the “found in”
clause. Part III argues that the federal courts should adopt the Second
Circuit’s interpretation as applied to the specific immigration pattern
discussed in this Note for numerous legal and policy reasons.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
AND RELATED DOCTRINES
In order to understand this circuit split, it is important to contextualize
§ 1326(a) within the larger landscape of U.S. immigration law and to define
the pertinent statutory language. Part I.A gives a brief overview of the INA
and how it came into law. Part I.B takes a detailed look at § 1326(a),
evaluating the congressional intent behind its passage, the meaning of its
language, and its legislative history. Part I.C explores the meaning and
history of the “official restraint” doctrine, which serves as a potential
defense to a “found in” violation and helps to inform the Ninth and Second
Circuit’s reasoning in their decisions.
15. See Ashley Parker, Senate Democrats Parry Vote Tied to Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2015, at A18.
16. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
17. See Parker, supra note 15.
18. 586 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2009).
19. 630 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2011).
20. 740 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2014).
21. See infra Part I.C.
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A. The Immigration and Naturalization Act: A “Hideous Creature”
Since about 1875, the federal government has exercised exclusive power
to regulate and control immigration in the United States.22 In 1917,
Congress passed the first comprehensive national immigration legislation
with the Immigration Act of 1917,23 in response to an influx of European
immigration resulting from the federal government’s previously liberal
immigration policy.24 This Act codified the grounds for deportation and the
process for deporting aliens, and it set forth a list of specific immigrant
classes excluded from immigrating to the United States.25
In an effort to modernize, recodify, and consolidate all immigration and
naturalization policies into a single act, Congress, in 1952, enacted the INA,
also known as the McCarran-Walter Act.26 The INA expanded the grounds
for deportation and provided aliens with greater flexibility when choosing
to which country they would be deported.27 However, the expansion of
deportation grounds led to great inconsistencies among courts in
interpreting some of the Act’s provisions and confusion at the federal
agency level over which of the various provisions the Attorney General
should invoke during deportation hearings.28 In response to continuing
confusion and inconsistency, Congress has amended the INA numerous
times since its initial passage in 1952.29
One of these amendments was the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199630 (IIRIRA). Congress passed
IIRIRA to reorganize the immigration process and provisions of the original
INA of 1952 as well as to strengthen the presence of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in immigration proceedings.31 Specifically,
IIRIRA vastly expanded the grounds for deportation of noncitizens and
reduced the availability of relief to such noncitizens.32 IIRIRA also
introduced expedited procedures for the removal of noncitizens and
imposed additional restrictions on noncitizens seeking asylum.33
22. See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 795–96 (2008). Prior to 1875, the individual states played a major role
in regulating immigration. For a detailed discussion on this point, see Gerald L. Neuman,
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833
(1993).
23. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
24. See Jamie Norman, Accepting the Unacceptable: How Jama v. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Affects Deportation Policies with Non-Accepting Governments, 26 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 159, 161–62 (2006).
25. Id. at 162.
26. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
27. See Norman, supra note 24, at 164.
28. Id. at 164–65.
29. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 1.
30. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.); see also Kevin J. Fandl, Immigration Posses: U.S. Immigration
Law and Local Enforcement Practices, 34 J. LEGIS. 16, 20 (2008).
31. Norman, supra note 24, at 167 n.24.
32. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1345 (2010).
33. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 22.
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Additionally, IIRIRA changed some of the terminology of U.S.
immigration law.34 Prior to IIRIRA’s passage, the law distinguished
between noncitizens who were physically within the United States and
those who were outside U.S. borders seeking entry.35 Noncitizens who
were already within the United States faced deportation proceedings for
committing deportable offenses, while those seeking entry from outside of
the United States faced exclusion proceedings if found to be inadmissible at
the border.36 While IIRIRA preserved separate criteria for deportability and
inadmissibility,37 it placed all deportable or inadmissible noncitizens in
“removal” proceedings.38 Therefore, today a noncitizen may be “removed”
from the United States if found to be either inadmissible or deportable.39
B. Section 1326(a): The Crime of Illegal Reentry
One of the provisions of the INA—8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)—relates to
punishing aliens who illegally reenter the United States after previous
removal.40 The most current version of the statute provides that any
individual who is “denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding” and “enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time
found in, the United States” is guilty of a felony and “shall be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”41 The purpose of
this provision was to impose a uniform penalty on any alien who returned to
the United States without permission after deportation, regardless of the
basis for the original deportation.42
As § 1326(a) indicates, there are three separate ways for a previously
removed alien to violate the statute: (1) by entering the United States;
(2) by attempting to enter the United States; or (3) by being “found in” the
United States.43 It is difficult to draw distinctions between these violations,
especially between the crimes of “entering” and being “found in” the
United States. It is also difficult to deduce the actual meaning of the terms
“enters,” “attempts to enter,” and “found in.” Nevertheless, each term has a
34. See Eagly, supra note 32, at 1289 n.39.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. For a list of grounds for deportability, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012). For a list of
inadmissibility grounds, see id. § 1182.
38. See Eagly, supra note 32, at 1289 n.39. Accordingly, this Note refers to all
previously deported or excluded aliens as “previously removed” aliens.
39. See id.
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
41. Id. The statute also provides an exception for aliens who gain express approval from
the Attorney General to reapply for admission into the United States and to aliens who were
removed under certain excludability grounds that do not require advance approval from the
Attorney General to reapply for admission. See id.
42. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 835 n.10 (1987) (citing S. REP.
NO. 81-1515, at 656 (1950)). Section 1326(b) of the statute relates to sentencing
enhancements based on the category of crime that the alien was convicted of that triggered
the initial removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a); see also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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separate and distinct meaning,44 and federal courts have used tools of
statutory interpretation to define each term.45 In doing so, the courts first
have looked to the plain meaning of the statute, and then interpreted its
language to give effect to Congress’s intent in passing the statute.46
Additionally, the courts have employed the canon against surplusage47
when construing § 1326(a), avoiding interpretations that would render
words redundant or meaningless.48 Lastly, while legislative history may aid
in statutory interpretation, determinative legislative history on § 1326(a) is
practically nonexistent and therefore has not been used by the courts to
construe the meaning of the statute’s terms.49
This section discusses how the courts have defined the terms “enters,”
“attempts to enter,” and “found in,” using the tools of statutory
interpretation noted above.50
1. The Meaning of “Enters”
Prior to 1952, statutes regulating immigration in the United States did not
define the words “enter” or “entry.”51 This changed with the passage of the
INA, which defined “entry” as “any coming of an alien into the United
States from a foreign port or place.”52 However, after several amendments
to the INA, the above definition is no longer in place.53 Instead, case law
has developed a more precise definition of “entry” that includes three
requirements: “(1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States,
i.e., physical presence; (2)(a) inspection and admission by an immigration
officer, or (b) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest
inspection point; and finally (3) freedom from official restraint.”54 All
three requirements must be met in order to affect an “entry” into the United
States.55

44. See infra Part I.B.1–3.
45. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
46. See United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing United
States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940)); see also infra notes 77–78.
47. The canon against surplusage is a tool of statutory interpretation stating that terms
within a statute should be read broadly so that each term has a different and separate
meaning from the other terms in the statute. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 573 (2013) (reviewing
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
(2012)).
48. See United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991);
DiSantillo, 615 F.2d at 135; see also infra note 77.
49. See DiSantillo, 615 F.2d at 135 (describing the legislative history of § 1326(a) as
“barren”).
50. See infra Part I.B.1–3.
51. United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1954).
52. Id.
53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). The term “entry” is no longer defined in this or any
other section of the current INA. Rather, it has been replaced with the term “admission.” Id.
54. Matter of Ching & Chen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 203, 205 (B.I.A. 1984) (citing Matter of
Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 1973)).
55. See id.
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The first requirement of the “entry” test is self-explanatory: one must
physically cross the border into the United States.56 The second and third
requirements require further clarification. Under prong (2)(a), the alien
must physically present him or herself to an immigration officer at an
immigration inspection point for inspection or admission.57 Alternatively,
under prong (2)(b), the alien must actually and intentionally evade either the
completion of inspection at the checkpoint58 or the inspection point
altogether.59 Therefore, an alien may cross the border surreptitiously under
prong (2)(b) and still effectuate an entry, despite lack of knowledge by
immigration officials of this entry.60 The third requirement for entry,
“freedom from official restraint,” requires the most clarification, as “official
restraint” is facially ambiguous, and its meaning is complex.61 “[F]reedom
from official restraint” requires freedom from continuous government
observation or surveillance from the moment an alien attempts to make an
entry.62
Accordingly, a previously removed alien has “entered” into the United
States only after meeting all three of the requirements outlined above.63
Once this entry has been effectuated, the alien has violated the “entry”
prong of § 1326(a) and therefore may be subject to serving time in prison.64
2. The Meaning of “Attempts to Enter”
Like the “entry” test, case law has also developed a working test to
determine whether an alien has “attempted to enter” the United States.65
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Congress must
have intended to include the crimes committed by entry . . . through the regular immigration
service procedures, of which the INS would have an official record . . . .”).
60. See id.
61. See infra Part I.C.
62. United States v. Bello-Bahena, 411 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005). As “freedom
from official restraint” factors heavily into the meaning of the “found in” prong of § 1326(a),
the definition of “official restraint” is discussed in greater detail in Part I.C.1.
63. See Matter of Ching & Chen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 203, 205 (B.I.A. 1984).
64. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012). There is a caveat here. An alien violates the “entry”
prong of § 1326(a) by effectuating an entry through the (2)(a) requirement. However, those
effectuating an entry through the (2)(b) requirement do not violate the “entry” prong; rather,
they violate the “found in” prong of § 1326(a), as they are entering into the United States
surreptitiously, and INS has no record of the entry. This anomalous idea is further examined
in Part I.B.3.
65. See United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1131–32 (5th Cir. 1993). A
majority of the circuit courts have also held that the crime of “entry” under § 1326(a) is a
general intent crime, not a specific intent crime. See, e.g., United States v. GracidasUlibarry, 192 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We therefore join other circuits in the view
that the government need not prove that a defendant had specific intent to violate the statute;
all that is required is that a defendant enter or attempt to enter the United States voluntarily
without permission.”); United States v. Martus, 138 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
government need only prove a voluntary act of reentry or attempted reentry by the defendant
that is not expressly sanctioned by the Attorney General.”); United States v. TrevinoMartinez, 86 F.3d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1996) (“This court concludes with the majority of circuits
that § 1326 does not require the government to prove specific intent nor does it provide an
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The test includes four requirements: (1) the perpetrator must have been an
alien at the time of the offense; (2) the alien must have been previously
arrested and removed; (3) the alien must have attempted to enter the United
States; and (4) the alien must not have received express consent from the
Attorney General to apply for readmission to the United States since the
time of his or her previous removal.66 The first, second, and fourth prongs
of this test are self-explanatory. However, the third prong does little to
actually define what an “attempted entry” looks like.
The courts have acknowledged and addressed this problem by holding
that any previously removed alien who, without authorization from the
Attorney General, voluntarily approaches a recognized immigration port of
entry67 and makes a false claim of citizenship or residency, has “attempted
to enter” the United States.68 The Fifth Circuit further clarified that, unlike
an “entry,” an “attempted entry” does not require “freedom from official
restraint” because “[t]o graft ‘freedom from official restraint’ onto the crime
of attempted entry would make that crime synonymous with actual entry.”69
Accordingly, a previously removed alien “attempts to enter” the United
States in violation of § 1326(a) by voluntarily approaching an immigration
point of entry, making a false claim of citizenship or residency to the
immigration officer, and ultimately failing to make an actual entry,
regardless of whether the alien is “free from official restraint.”70

alien who reenters this country illegally with a defense of reasonable mistake.”); United
States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743, 746 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We agree with the majority of
the circuits which have considered the issue and held that only general intent must be proven
by the government in order to secure a conviction under § 1326.”); United States v. MirandaEnriquez, 842 F.2d 1211, 1212 (10th Cir. 1988) (“To secure a section 1326 conviction . . .
[n]o intent to break the law—whether characterized as ‘specific intent’ or ‘general criminal
intent’—must be proved.”); United States v. Hussein, 675 F.2d 114, 116 (6th Cir. 1982)
(“[T]he Government need not prove specific intent, that is, that appellants knew they were
not entitled to reenter the country without the permission of the Attorney General.”).
66. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 1131–32.
67. As defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, a recognized port of entry
is “[a]ny location in the United States or its territories that is designated as a point of entry
for aliens and U.S. citizens. All district and files control offices are also considered ports,
since they become locations of entry for aliens adjusting to immigrant status.” Definition of
Terms, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/definition-terms (last visited Feb. 23,
2015).
68. See United States v. Cabral, 252 F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 2001) (“An alien who has
been deported and, without prior authorization, voluntarily approaches a port of entry and
makes a false claim of residency has attempted to re-enter the United States . . . .”);
Gracidas-Ulibarry, 192 F.3d at 930 (“[A previously removed] alien . . . voluntarily ‘attempts
to enter’ by approaching a port of entry and making a false claim of citizenship.”);
Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 1133 (“The precise question for our determination is whether
an alien who approaches a port of entry and who makes a false claim of citizenship . . . has
attempted to enter the United States. . . . Cardenas attempted to enter by attempting to
convince the border inspectors that he was entitled to pass.”).
69. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 1133.
70. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. Additionally, the Supreme Court has
held that the crime of “attempted entry” under § 1326(a) is a general intent crime, not a
specific intent crime. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 107–08 (2007).
Therefore, a previously deported alien need only “attempt” to enter the United States in
order to violate the “attempts to enter” prong of the statute. Id. at 108.
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3. The Meaning of “Found In”
The crux of the conflict explored in this Note is the meaning of the
“found in” clause of § 1326(a).71 The plain text of the statute neither
defines what “found in” means nor distinguishes it from the offenses of
“enter[ing]” or “attempt[ing] to enter.”72 In fact, the term “found in” was
not included in the original language of § 1326(a) when it was first enacted
in 1917.73 This created an anomaly in the law: previously removed aliens
could effectuate an entry into the United States by actually and intentionally
evading either the completion of inspection at a checkpoint or the
inspection point altogether without violating the “entry” prong of § 1326(a),
because immigration officials had no record of such aliens effectuating this
entry.74 Without record or knowledge of these entries, § 1326(a) lacked
any mechanism for punishing previously removed aliens who
surreptitiously reentered the United States.75
Congress addressed this issue in 1952 when it added the “found in”
language to the reenacted statute.76 Using various tools of statutory
interpretation—particularly the canon against surplusage—the courts have
interpreted this addition to imply that Congress intended to distinguish
between the crimes of entry, attempted entry, and being “found in” the
United States.77 The distinction is that only aliens who make a
surreptitious entry into the United States can violate the “found in” clause;
all others may be convicted under the “enters” or “attempts to enter”
clauses.78 Thus, previously removed aliens who are not apprehended by
immigration officers as they reenter the country nevertheless can be
prosecuted for unlawful entry when they are found.79

71. See infra Part II.
72. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012).
73. See United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 1980).
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See United States v. Rodriguez, 26 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating “[w]e think it
plain that ‘enters,’ ‘attempts to enter,’ and ‘is at any time found in’ describe three distinct
occasions on which a deported alien can violate Section 1326”); United States v. CanalsJimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Canals’ contention, with which we agree, is
that ‘found in’ must have a different meaning from ‘enters’ and ‘attempts to enter.’”);
DiSantillo, 615 F.2d at 134–35 (“[W]e must proceed on the assumption that Congress
intended a distinction among crimes committed at the separate times mentioned in the
statute.”).
78. See Rodriguez, 26 F.3d at 8 (“Congress must have intended to broaden the statute to
include the crime committed when an alien enters the United States surreptitiously, of which
the INS would have no official record, as well as the crimes committed by entry or attempted
entry through regular immigration procedures.”); Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d at 1287 (“In
order for ‘found in’ and ‘enters’ to have different meanings, thus to avoid ‘enters’ being a
mere redundancy, ‘found in’ must apply to aliens who have entered surreptitiously,
bypassing a recognized immigration port of entry.”); DiSantillo, 615 F.2d at 135 (“Congress
must have included the word ‘found’ in § 1326 to alleviate the difficult law enforcement
burden of finding and prosecuting this class of illegal aliens, who are already aware that they
are in violation of the law as evidenced by their surreptitious entry . . . .”).
79. Rodriguez, 26 F.3d at 8.
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Additionally, while the courts have interpreted “enters” and “found in” to
have distinct meanings and to constitute different offenses,80 the courts also
have held that a previously removed alien cannot be convicted of a “found
in” offense without first making an entry—albeit a surreptitious one—into
the United States.81 Without making this entry, there can be no violation of
either the “entry” or “found in” prongs of § 1326(a).82
As outlined above, the conflict at issue in this Note concerns whether a
certain group of immigrants, under an unusual set of circumstances, meets
the “found in” criteria.83 Yet, to fully appreciate that conflict, it is first
important to analyze what it means to be “free from official restraint,”84 a
requirement of an “entry” and, thus, to sustaining a “found in” conviction.85
C. The “Official Restraint” Analysis
As discussed above, the third requirement for effectuating an “entry” into
the United States is that the alien must be “free from official restraint.”86
Accordingly, if an alien is not free from official restraint, then he or she has
not effectuated an entry and the government cannot sustain a “found in”
conviction under § 1326(a).87 Therefore, an alien who is under “official
restraint” can argue there was no “entry” and thus, assert a complete
defense to being “found in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a).88
This section explores the meaning of “official restraint,” then discusses
certain requirements that make an alien “free from official restraint,” and
finally evaluates different factual scenarios where the courts have required
an “official restraint” analysis.
1. The Meaning of “Official Restraint”
For an alien to be considered under “official restraint,” that alien must be
under continuous governmental observation or surveillance from the
moment he or she attempted to make an entry into the United States.89
80. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he courts have not been so benighted as to think that a person could be found in the
United States if he had never entered at all. In fact, it is difficult to speak of one concept
without entangling it in the other.”); United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.3d 572, 576 (8th Cir.
1998) (“A reasonable reading of the indictment as a whole . . . should have alerted Diaz-Diaz
that he was accused of having unlawfully reentered the United States and of having been
found therein.”); United States v. Castrillon-Gonzalez, 77 F.3d 403, 406 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“By definition, one must enter the United States, either legally or illegally, in order to be
found therein.”).
82. See Castrillon-Gonzalez, 77 F.3d at 406. Therefore, a previously removed alien can
only violate the “attempts to enter” prong of § 1326(a) if he or she has not effectuated an
entry. See infra Part I.B.2.
83. See infra Part II.
84. See infra Part I.C.
85. See supra Part I.B.1–3.
86. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
88. See supra Part I.B.1–3.
89. See United States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Such surveillance can take the form of physical observation by any
government official,90 detainment at any U.S. port of entry,91 or any kind of
electronic surveillance.92 Additionally, the alien must “lack[] the freedom
to go at large and mix with the population,”93 but the alien need not be
aware of the surveillance.94 Any alien under this kind of sustained
surveillance has not entered the country in violation of § 1326(a).95 This
definition of “official restraint” has been adopted by at least three circuit
courts and appears uncontroversial.96
2. “Freedom from Official Restraint”:
The Exercise of “Free Will” During and After Entry
In order to be “free” from the official restraint described above, an alien
must demonstrate: (1) freedom from the forms of government surveillance
discussed in Part I.C.1;97 and (2) the exercise of “free will” after he or she
entered the United States.98 In order to exercise this “free will,” an alien
must fall out of sight of any physical or electronic surveillance for a
substantial amount of time,99 and must be able to freely “mix” with the
general population without fear that government officials are tracking the
alien’s whereabouts after he or she has entered into the United States.100
United States v. Martin-Plascencia101 helps demonstrate what “free will”
means. In Martin-Plascencia, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was
not under official restraint after surreptitiously entering the United States
through a recognized port of entry.102 While at the port of entry, Plascencia
bypassed the questioning and inspection areas, out of the view of any
physical or electronic surveillance by immigration officials, and crawled
through an opening in the fence to gain physical entry into United States
territory.103 Law enforcement officials apprehended Plascencia while he
90. See United States v. Ruiz-Lopez, 234 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2000).
91. See United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1954).
92. United States v. Zavala-Mendez, 411 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).
93. Matter of Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 469 (B.I.A. 1973).
94. See United States v. Bello-Bahena, 411 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005).
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1549 (3d Cir. 1995) (adopting the Second
Circuit’s definition of “official restraint” as defined in Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166
(2d Cir. 1990)); Correa, 901 F.2d at 1172 (defining official restraint as any “constraint
emanating from the government that would otherwise prevent [an alien] from physically
passing on”); United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730, 736–37 (1st Cir. 1980) (describing
similar instances of governmental surveillance as discussed above that constitute “official
restraint”).
97. See supra Part I.C.1.
98. United States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 677 (9th Cir. 1989)).
99. United States v. Zavala-Mendez, 411 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). In ZavalaMendez, the Ninth Circuit held that falling out of surveillance for “a half second” is not
substantial enough to be deemed free from official restraint. Id. at 1120–21.
100. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101. 532 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1976).
102. Id. at 1317–18.
103. Id. at 1317.
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attempted to scale a concrete wall, after traveling about fifty yards into the
United States past the point of entry.104
The Ninth Circuit held that even though Plascencia was within the
confines of a recognized point of entry, he was not under official restraint
because he managed to avoid any kind of physical or electronic surveillance
by law enforcement.105 The court also noted that, because Plascencia
surreptitiously avoided detection and escaped fifty yards into the United
States, he exercised “his free will, youthful enterprise, and physical agility
in evading fixed physical barriers in accomplishing his entry.”106 It is this
very kind of exercise of “free will” that most circuit courts agree constitutes
“freedom from official restraint” for purposes of determining whether an
alien has made an “entry” into the United States.107 The idea of exercising
“free will” plays an important role in determining whether the aliens in
Ambriz-Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias can argue that they were under
“official restraint,” in order to reverse their convictions of being “found in”
the United States in violation of § 1326(a).108
3. When to Require an “Official Restraint” Analysis
The courts are not always required to conduct an “official restraint”
analysis when investigating potential violations of § 1326(a).109 However,
they recognize two broad categories of cases where an “official restraint”
analysis is required: (1) cases involving aliens entering into the United
States through an airport;110 and (2) cases involving aliens who attempt to
surreptitiously enter the United States but are observed by immigration
officials in the process and are subsequently arrested.111 Additionally, there
is a conflict over whether the courts should require an “official restraint”
analysis for a third category, where a previously removed alien is
involuntarily handed over to U.S. officials by foreign officials after that
alien physically crossed the Canadian border in an attempt to leave the
United States.112 That conflict is discussed at length in Part II.D of this
Note, as it directly relates to the conflict over whether this group of aliens
meets the “found in” criteria of § 1326(a).113 Before reaching that

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 98–106 and accompanying text.
108. See infra Part II.D.
109. For example, the crime of “attempted entry” does not require an “official restraint”
analysis, because aliens attempting to enter the United States are under government
surveillance by their very nature of conversing with an immigration officer. See supra Part
I.B.2. Additionally, “freedom from official restraint” is not a requirement for the “attempted
entry” prong of § 1326(a). See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
110. See infra Part I.C.3.a.
111. See infra Part I.C.3.b.
112. See United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. GonzalezDiaz, 630 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719 (9th
Cir. 2009).
113. See infra Part II.D.
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discussion, however, it is first important to address the two scenarios where
the court has required an “official restraint” analysis.114
a. The Airport Cases
The first factual scenario where the courts have required an “official
restraint” analysis is when an alien physically enters the United States by an
airplane and immediately proceeds to an immigration or customs officer or
checkpoint in the airport.115 In United States v. Canals-Jimenez,116 the
defendant was a previously deported alien who physically reentered the
United States via an American Airlines flight into Miami from Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic.117 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
defendant was under “official restraint” after he de-boarded his plane,
walked past a few restaurants, and proceeded directly to an INS officer,
whereupon he was passed along to a secondary inspection area and detained
by the INS for a few days.118 In reaching its decision, the court noted that
“[f]or over a half century th[e] [Supreme] Court has held that the detention
of an alien in custody pending determination of his admissibility does not
legally constitute an entry though the alien is physically within the United
States,”119 and that Canal-Jimenez’s interaction with the INS officer at the
airport fit into this type of detention.120
The Fifth Circuit also applied an “official restraint” analysis to a similar
set of facts in United States v. Angeles-Mascote.121 In Angeles-Mascote,
Jose Manuel Angeles-Mascote, a previously deported alien who physically
entered the United States via airplane from Mexico to Texas, was also
found to be under “official restraint” after landing in the airport and
proceeding directly to a U.S. immigration officer.122 Relying on the
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Canals-Jimenez, the Fifth Circuit noted that
an alien who seeks admission to the United States by voluntarily
approaching a recognized port of entry cannot be considered “found in” the
United States, because that alien is under “official restraint” and, thus, has
not yet made an “entry.”123 This reasoning is consistent with other circuits
that have held that an alien cannot be “found in” the United States without

114. See infra Part I.C.3.a–b.
115. See United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 206 F.3d 529, 530–32 (5th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1285–89 (11th Cir. 1991).
116. 943 F.2d 1284 (11th Cir. 1991).
117. Id. at 1285.
118. Id. at 1285–86.
119. Id. at 1288 (quoting Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958)). While the
Eleventh Circuit does not refer to “official restraint” by name, the detention the court refers
to is one of the categories of surveillance that the definition of “official restraint”
encompasses. See supra Part I.C.1.
120. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d at 1288.
121. 206 F.3d 529, 530–32 (5th Cir. 2000).
122. Id. at 530.
123. Id. at 531.
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first making an “entry,”124 and that one cannot make an “entry” if he or she
physically entered the country under “official restraint.”125
b. Attempted Surreptitious Entry
The second category of cases where courts have required an “official
restraint” analysis is when an alien attempts to sneak across the border but
is observed in the process by government officials and subsequently
arrested.126 In United States v. Bello-Bahena,127 Carmelo Bello-Bahena
attempted to sneak across the border from Mexico to the United States with
a group of other illegal aliens but was observed by U.S. Border Patrol
Agent Drake.128 Agent Drake radioed to Agent Rodriguez that BelloBahena was heading toward Hagen’s Pond, where Agent Rodriguez was
performing “line watch duties.”129 Agent Drake guided Agent Rodriguez
and two other agents to Bello-Bahena’s location, where Agent Rodriguez
found him hiding in a bush. Agent Rodriguez asked for his documents,
arrested him, and transported him to a Border Patrol Station for further
processing.130
While the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that there was a question of fact
over whether Bello-Bahena was under constant surveillance from the
moment he crossed the border until his arrest and processing (and thus,
under “official restraint”),131 the court still noted that it was appropriate to
conduct an “official restraint” analysis, and that the lower court erred by
failing to provide a jury instruction on “official restraint.”132
II. THE SPLIT: INCONSISTENT “FOUND IN” DETERMINATIONS
The Ninth and Second Circuits have made inconsistent determinations in
finding whether a certain group of previously removed aliens should be
convicted of being “found in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a).133
The Ninth Circuit held that previously removed aliens, who surreptitiously
reenter the United States illegally but remain undetected by U.S. officials
124. See supra Part I.B.3.
125. See supra Part I.C.1.
126. See United States v. Bello-Bahena, 411 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005).
127. 411 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005).
128. Id. at 1086.
129. Id. “Line watch duties” generally include monitoring the border to ensure that
illegal aliens and contraband are not surreptitiously entering into the United States. See
United States v. Nelson, No. CR 11-01364-TUC-JGZ, 2011 WL 7477835, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz.
Dec. 5, 2011).
130. Bello-Bahena, 411 F.3d at 1086.
131. Id. at 1091–92. The court found that it was unclear whether Agent Drake had
actually observed Bello-Bahena crossing the border. If Agent Drake had, then Bello-Bahena
would have been under official restraint from the time he crossed the border to his
subsequent arrest. If Agent Drake had not, then Bello-Bahena would have been free from
official restraint for some period after illegally crossing the border. The court noted that the
jury had sufficient evidence to decide either way and therefore found that the lower court
erred by not providing a jury instruction on official restraint. Id.
132. Id.
133. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
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until they attempt to leave the country and are involuntary returned by
foreign officials after physically crossing into that foreign territory, should
be considered “found in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a).134 To
the contrary, the Second Circuit held that aliens under the same
circumstances should not be considered “found in” the United States in
violation of the statute.135
In arriving at these conflicting determinations, the Ninth and Second
Circuits disagreed over two legal questions pertinent to the “found in”
analysis: (1) whether the aliens were continuously present in the United
States from their initial surreptitious reentry, even after physically crossing
the Canadian border with no intent to be present in the United States;136 and
(2) whether an “official restraint” analysis should apply to these cases.137
In addition to their conflicting answers to these legal questions, each circuit
also relied on differing policy justifications to explain how the “found in”
clause should be applied and evaluated in these cases.138
Part II.A discusses the facts of the Ninth and Second Circuit cases at
issue here. Part II.B then draws similarities between the immigration
patterns followed by the previously removed aliens in each case. Part II.C
explores the Ninth Circuit’s legal justification of its continuous presence
theory in holding that the aliens at issue were “found in” the United States,
and then discusses the Second Circuit’s conflicting holding criticizing this
continuous presence theory as a legal fiction. Part II.D describes the Ninth
Circuit’s justification for holding that an “official restraint” analysis is
inapplicable, and then discusses the Second Circuit’s contrary holding that
the analysis is indeed applicable and precludes such aliens from receiving a
“found in” conviction. Finally, Part II.E addresses the differing policy
justifications adopted by the Ninth and Second Circuits in determining how
the “found in” clause should be applied and evaluated in these types of
cases.
A. A Factual Analysis of United States v. Ambriz-Ambriz,
United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, and United States v. Macias
To understand the conflicting determinations reached by the Ninth and
Second Circuits, it is important to track the specific immigration patterns of
the aliens at issue in each case in order to draw the similarities among each
of the three situations. This section discusses the Ninth Circuit cases first,
as they were decided before the Second Circuit’s Macias decision and help
to set the landscape for the conflict examined in this Note.
134. United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 2009).
135. United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2014).
136. See infra Part II.C.
137. The Ninth Circuit held that an “official restraint” analysis was unnecessary and
inapplicable to the facts of these cases, while the Second Circuit held that an “official
restraint” analysis was necessary and could be used by the aliens in these cases as a defense
to their “found in” convictions. See infra Part II.D.
138. See infra Part II.E.
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1. The Ninth Circuit
Within the past six years, the Ninth Circuit has twice applied a “found
in” analysis to an analogous set of facts.139 This section discusses these
cases in chronological order.
The Ninth Circuit first engaged in a “found in” analysis in United States
v. Ambriz-Ambriz.140 Jose Ines Ambriz-Ambriz was a Mexican citizen who
was removed from the United States in 1985 after being convicted of an
aggravated felony—a deportable offense—in 1980.141 At some point after
his deportation, Ambriz reentered the United States unlawfully without
inspection or permission.142 On February 28, 2008, Ambriz attempted to
leave the United States by driving his car across the Canadian border with
two other individuals.143 While they physically crossed the border into
Canadian territory,144 they were denied entry into Canada.145 Canadian
officials forced Ambriz to subsequently turn his car around and cross the
border back into the United States, where he was stopped for inspection at
the Roosville Port of Entry.146
While stopped, a U.S. Border Patrol agent asked Ambriz for
identification, and Ambriz showed the officer a California driver’s
license.147 The officer then directed Ambriz and his vehicle to a secondary
inspection station, where fingerprinting and a record check revealed that
Ambriz was a Mexican citizen who was removed from the United States in
1985.148 The officer promptly arrested Ambriz, and a grand jury indicted
him for illegal reentry in violation of § 1326(a).149 The district court held
that Ambriz was indeed “found in” the United States in violation of
§ 1326(a) and sentenced him to twenty-eight months in prison, followed by
a three-year period of supervised release.150 Ambriz timely appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.151
The Ninth Circuit agreed that Ambriz was indeed “found in” the United
States in violation of § 1326(a), because he never legally gained entry into
Canada and was therefore continuously present in the United States even
139. See infra Part II.A.1.
140. 586 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2009).
141. Id. at 721.
142. Id. It is unclear exactly when Ambriz made this reentry into the United States, and
the Ninth Circuit does not discuss or focus on this point. See id.
143. Id. It is also unclear why Ambriz sought entry into Canada. The court speculated
that it could have been for a medical procedure but again did not focus on this point. Id.
144. Id. at 723 (“Although Ambriz may have technically traveled onto Canadian land
from the United States, he was never legally in Canada.”).
145. Id. at 721.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. Count one of the indictment stated that Ambriz was “found to have reentered the
United States,” but the district court struck this language because it is not part of the actual
language contained in § 1326(a) and replaced it with “found in.” Id. at 721–22; see also 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012).
150. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d at 722.
151. Id.
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after crossing into Canada.152 The Ninth Circuit also held that an “official
restraint” analysis was inapplicable153 for reasons that are discussed further
in Part II.D.1.154
The Ninth Circuit addressed the same issue again only two years after
Ambriz in United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz.155 Javier Dolores GonzalezDiaz was a Mexican citizen who was previously removed from the United
States for deportable offenses on four separate occasions prior to 2009.156
In April 2009, Gonzalez-Diaz illegally entered from Mexico into Arizona
surreptitiously.157 While unlawfully living in the United States, GonzalezDiaz procured false identification and applied for a U.S. passport using
another U.S. citizen’s name, birth certificate, and social security number.158
On June 19, 2009, Gonzalez-Diaz drove his car from Montana to the
Canadian border, where he attempted to gain entry into Canada.159 At the
border, Gonzalez-Diaz presented his fraudulent Utah identification card to
the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officer, who then asked
Gonzalez-Diaz for proof of U.S. citizenship.160 Gonzalez-Diaz was unable
to meet this request and, accordingly, the CBSA officer directed the vehicle
to a secondary inspection area where a further search revealed conflicting
documents with Gonzalez-Diaz’s name and another individual’s name on
them.161 In light of these inconsistencies and the fact that Gonzalez-Diaz
was unable to provide the officers with proof of U.S. citizenship, the agents
denied Gonzalez-Diaz entry into Canada and informed him that they would
be preparing an “Allowed to Leave Canada”162 form so that he could return
back into the United States.163
Gonzalez-Diaz then told the officers that he could not return to the
United States out of fear of dying in prison and could not return to Mexico
out of fear that he would be killed by a drug cartel.164 The CBSA officer
handling the case interpreted these remarks as a potential refugee claim and
completed an “Entry for Further Examination” form on Gonzalez-Diaz’s
behalf.165 A Royal Mountain Canadian Police (RMCP) escort drove
152. Id. at 725. The reasoning behind this legal conclusion is discussed further in Part
II.C.1.
153. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d at 721.
154. See infra Part II.D.1.
155. 630 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2011).
156. Id. at 1241–42.
157. Id. at 1241.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. An “Allowed to Leave Canada” form is a form issued by Canadian border officials
to persons deemed inadmissible into Canada. See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, ENF 5 WRITING
44(1) REPORTS, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf05eng.pdf. This form allows inadmissible persons to withdraw their applications to enter
Canada, and then allows them to voluntarily leave Canada without further questioning by
Canadian officials. See id.
163. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1241.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Gonzalez-Diaz fifty-five miles into Canadian territory to the Carway Port of
Entry.166 However, it was closed upon Gonzalez-Diaz’s arrival, so he was
taken another fifteen miles away to a RMCP detention facility, where
officials held him overnight.167 The next morning, on June 20, 2009,
RMCP brought Gonzalez-Diaz back to the Carway Point of Entry, where he
was interviewed and found inadmissible due to his lack of a passport.168
Canadian officers then issued an exclusion order to Gonzalez-Diaz and
drove him back across the U.S. border.169
Once across the border, the Canadian officials released Gonzalez-Diaz
into the custody of U.S. officials at Piegan Port of Entry in Montana.170
While at Piegan, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) ran several
records checks, which revealed that Gonzalez-Diaz was a Mexican citizen
who had been previously removed from the United States on four
occasions.171 Gonzalez-Diaz admitted to these facts and was arrested.172
The U.S. government indicted Gonzalez-Diaz on eight counts, including
being “found in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a).173 During his
trial in the district court, Gonzalez-Diaz moved for acquittal under Rule 29
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that he was not “found
in” the United States in violation of the statute.174 The court denied his
motion, holding that he was “found in” the United States, and convicted
him on all of the additional counts.175 Gonzalez-Diaz timely appealed the
decision to the Ninth Circuit.176
Borrowing from its earlier analysis in Ambriz-Ambriz, the Ninth Circuit
held that Gonzalez-Diaz was indeed “found in” the United States in
violation of § 1326(a), because, like Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz never legally
gained entry into Canada and was therefore continuously present in the
United States even after crossing well into Canadian territory.177 The court
also held, as it did in Ambriz-Ambriz, that an “official restraint” analysis
was inapplicable to the facts of this case and, therefore, Gonzalez-Diaz’s
“official restraint” defense was moot.178
2. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit had its first opportunity to address the immigration
pattern present in Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz as it relates to the
“found in” clause of § 1326(a) in the factually analogous case of United
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1241–42.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1243–44.
Id. at 1244; see also infra Part II.D.1.
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States v. Macias.179 Walter Yovany Vasquez Macias was a citizen of
Honduras who had been removed from the United States in 2000 after
being convicted of selling drugs to undercover police officers—a deportable
offense—in the late 1990s.180 Macias then surreptitiously reentered the
country illegally at some point in 2001 and entered into the antique
business.181 For unknown reasons, Macias decided to leave the United
States and traveled with a friend from Texas to the Canadian side of
Niagara Falls.182 On January 10, 2012,183 Macias and his friend walked
across the Rainbow Bridge into Canada, where a CBSA officer spotted
Macias on the Canadian side of the bridge.184 The officer then brought
Macias into a Canadian facility for further inspection, where Macias
revealed that he lacked a U.S. passport or a visa to enter into Canada.185 A
CBSA officer then refused Macias entry into Canada and prepared an
“Allowed to Leave Canada” form.186 Canadian officers then brought
Macias back into the United States in handcuffs and forcibly turned him
over to USCBP officials.187
After running an immigration investigation and multiple records checks,
USCBP officials discovered that Macias was a Honduran citizen who had
been previously removed in 2000 for his felony drug conviction.188 Macias
was subsequently arrested and indicted for being “found in” the United
States in violation of § 1326(a).189 On May 11, 2012, a jury found Macias
guilty of being “found in” the United States in violation of the statute, and
Macias thereafter moved for a judgment of acquittal despite the verdict.190
The district court denied the motion, finding the motion untimely and,
relying on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Gonzalez-Diaz, finding it
unnecessary to reconsider its prior ruling with respect to the merits of the
case.191 Macias appealed the decision to the Second Circuit.192
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s previous decisions in Ambriz-Ambriz and
Gonzalez-Diaz, the Second Circuit held that Macias was not “found in” the
United States in violation of § 1326(a).193 In its ruling, the Second Circuit
discredited the Ninth Circuit’s “continuous presence” theory as a “legal
fiction,” noting that Macias was not continuously present in the United
179. 740 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2014).
180. Id. at 97. Prior to his deportation in 2000, Macias had been detained in California in
1990, voluntarily left the country, and then illegally reentered the country. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 97–98.
183. United States v. Macias, No. 12-CR-90-A, 2012 WL 3581024, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2012), rev’d and remanded, 740 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2014).
184. Macias, 740 F.3d at 98.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. United States v. Macias, No. 12-CR-90-A, 2012 WL 3581024, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2012), rev’d and remanded, 740 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2014).
191. Id. at *3.
192. Macias, 740 F.3d at 98.
193. Id.
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States after he physically crossed the border into Canada.194 The Second
Circuit also held that an “official restraint” analysis was necessary and
applicable to the facts of this case (and therefore, by implication, to the
facts of Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz), and precluded Macias (and,
similarly, would have precluded Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz) from a “found
in” conviction under § 1326(a).195
B. Factual Similarities Among Ambriz-Ambriz,
Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias
There are important similarities between the facts of Ambriz-Ambriz,
Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias that enable the Ninth and Second Circuits to
evaluate the issues presented in each case using the same “found in”
criteria.196 This section proceeds by discussing three areas of similarity
between the three cases: (1) each alien’s prior immigration history and
status; (2) each alien’s physical presence in Canada; and (3) each alien’s
denial of entry into Canada and subsequent involuntary return to the United
States.
1. Prior Immigration History and Status
Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias were all present in the United States
at some point preceding their illegal reentries at issue here, before being
removed for various offenses.197 Each alien also made an unlawful
surreptitious reentry after his initial removal and remained in the United
States undetected.198 Therefore, Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias were
not lawfully present in the United States at any point after their last
reentries into the United States before attempting to cross into Canada.199
2. Physical Presence in Canada
Another important similarity is that each alien physically crossed the
border into Canada before being apprehended.200 In Ambriz-Ambriz,
Ambriz drove his car past the Canadian border and into Canadian
territory.201 Despite his short time in Canada, the Ninth Circuit still
acknowledged that Ambriz “technically traveled onto Canadian land from

194. Id. at 99. The court’s reasoning behind this conclusion is discussed at length in Part
II.C.2.
195. Macias, 740 F.3d at 99–100; see also infra Part II.D.2.
196. See infra Part II.B.1–3.
197. See Macias, 740 F.3d at 97; United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d 1239, 1241–
42 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 2009).
198. See Macias, 740 F.3d at 97; Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1241; Ambriz-Ambriz, 586
F.3d at 721.
199. See supra Part II.A.
200. See Macias, 740 F.3d at 98; Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1241; Ambriz-Ambriz, 586
F.3d at 721, 723.
201. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d at 721, 723.
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the United States” and hence, was physically in Canada at the time of his
apprehension.202
In Gonzalez-Diaz, Gonzalez-Diaz likewise drove his vehicle across the
Canadian border and into Canadian territory.203 The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that Gonzalez-Diaz had a “brief physical presence in
Canada,” and hence, was physically present in Canada at the time of his
apprehension.204 While Gonzalez-Diaz spent a longer time in Canadian
territory and custody than Ambriz, the Ninth Circuit noted that such factual
distinctions on this point were “immaterial.”205
Lastly, in Macias, Macias gained physical entry into Canada by walking
across the Rainbow Bridge and crossing the Canadian border.206 The
Second Circuit noted that Macias was “on Canadian soil seeking admission
into Canada” and, thus, he, too, was physically present in Canada at the
time of his apprehension.207
3. Denial of Entry and Involuntary Return
The last important factual similarity is that each alien was denied entry
into Canada and subsequently forced to return to the United States.208 In
Ambriz-Ambriz, Canadian border officials forced Ambriz to turn his vehicle
around and proceed back to the United States after denying him entry.209 In
Gonzalez-Diaz, Canadian officials physically drove Gonzalez-Diaz across
the border and released him into U.S. custody after denying him entry into
Canada.210 In Macias, Canadian officials forcibly brought Macias back into
the United States in handcuffs and turned him over to USCBP officials after
denying him entry.211 These factual similarities are important, as they
enable the Ninth and Second Circuits to evaluate each case using the same
criteria.212
C. Continuous Presence: Legal Fact or Legal Fiction?
In arriving at conflicting determinations over whether aliens under the
circumstances described above213 meet the “found in” criteria in violation
of § 1326(a), the Ninth and Second Circuits first disagree over whether such
aliens are “continuously present” in the United States even after physically
crossing the border into Canada.214 In Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz,
202. Id. at 723.
203. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1241.
204. Id. at 1240.
205. Id. at 1244.
206. United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
207. Id. at 99.
208. See id. at 98; Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1241; United States v. Ambriz-Ambriz,
586 F.3d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 2009).
209. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d at 721.
210. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1241.
211. Macias, 740 F.3d at 98.
212. See infra Part II.C–D.
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. See infra Part II.C.1–2.
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the Ninth Circuit held that Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz were continuously
present in the United States even after physically entering Canada, and they
therefore had never legally left the United States for the purposes of being
“found in” the country by U.S. immigration officials.215 In Macias, the
Second Circuit discredited this “continuous presence” theory, calling it a
“legal fiction,” and held that, because Macias was not continuously present
in the United States after physically crossing into Canada, he could not be
considered “found in” the United States on this ground.216 This section first
discusses the Ninth Circuit’s rationale for employing its “continuous
presence” theory and then discusses the Second Circuit’s rejection of the
theory.
1. The Ninth Circuit: Continuous Presence As Legal Fact
In Ambriz-Ambriz, the Ninth Circuit sustained Ambriz’s “found in”
conviction on the grounds that Ambriz was continuously present in the
United States on February 28, 2008, even after physically crossing into
Canadian territory.217 The court reasoned that because Ambriz never
gained legal entry into Canada when he attempted to drive his vehicle
across the border, he never legally left the United States.218 Therefore,
because Ambriz never legally left the United States, he was still “present”
in the United States during his apprehension at the Canadian border.219 The
court also noted that because Ambriz failed to make a legal entry into
Canada, he was not reentering the United States from a foreign country
after Canadian officials turned his vehicle around and directed him to the
Roosville Point of Entry on the U.S. side of the border.220 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit took the view that Ambriz had been continuously present in
the United States from the moment he surreptitiously reentered the country
after his initial removal in 1985 through the moment U.S. officials
discovered his unlawful presence at the Roosville Point of Entry, despite his
brief physical presence in Canada.221 The Ninth Circuit affirmed Ambriz’s
“found in” conviction on the grounds that, for purposes of § 1326(a),
Ambriz never left the United States and was therefore “found in” the
country during his detainment at the Roosville Point of Entry.222
In Gonzalez-Diaz, the Ninth Circuit utilized this continuous presence
theory to affirm Gonzalez-Diaz’s “found in” conviction.223 In that case, the
Ninth Circuit applied the same principles it used in Ambriz-Ambriz to hold
that Gonzalez-Diaz was continuously present in the United States despite
his overnight stay in a Canadian detention facility, because he never gained
215. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1244; United States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719,
723–24 (9th Cir. 2009).
216. Macias, 740 F.3d at 99.
217. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d at 721.
218. Id. at 723–24.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 722–23.
221. See id. at 721.
222. See id.
223. See United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d 1239, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2011).
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legal entry into Canada and hence, never left the United States.224 The
court acknowledged its reliance on Ambriz-Ambriz, noting “[GonzalezDiaz] neither departed the United States nor entered Canada in the sense
contemplated by the aforementioned authorities. Our conclusion is dictated
by United States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, . . . which we decided shortly after
Gonzalez-Diaz’s trial.”225
While Gonzalez-Diaz himself conceded that he was “found” by U.S.
Immigration officials after Canadian officials released him into U.S.
custody at the Piegan Port of Entry in Montana, he denied that he was
“found in” the United States, because he was not present in the United
States when he was first found by Canadian officials on the Canadian side
of the border.226 Instead, Gonzalez-Diaz argued that his presence in the
United States ended when he physically crossed into the Canadian border
and was held there from June 19 to 20.227 Accordingly, he argued that he
could not have been “continuously present” in the United States.228 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, however, because Gonzalez-Diaz
“neither departed the United States nor entered Canada in the sense
contemplated by the aforementioned authorities.”229 Further, the Ninth
Circuit noted that while Gonzalez-Diaz was physically in Canada from June
19 to 20, he was in some form of custody during his entire stay and
therefore, he remained “in” the United States until he was “found” by U.S.
officials on June 20.230
Gonzalez-Diaz also tried to argue that Ninth Circuit precedent dictates
that previously removed aliens like Gonzalez-Diaz who surreptitiously
reenter the United States and remain undetected can avoid a “found in”
conviction by leaving the United States,231 and that he indeed “left” the
United States on June 19.232 However, the Ninth Circuit also rejected this
argument, returning to the idea that because Gonzalez-Diaz never gained
legal entry into Canada, he never “left” the United States to avoid a “found
in” conviction.233 Accordingly, as in Ambriz-Ambriz, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed Gonzalez-Diaz’s “found in” conviction on the grounds that he was
continuously present in the United States from the moment he
surreptitiously reentered the country after his initial removal proceedings
until U.S. officials discovered his unlawful presence at the Piegan Point of
Entry, despite his overnight physical presence in Canada.234
224. See id.
225. Id. at 1243.
226. Id. at 1242–43.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1243.
230. Id. at 1244.
231. Id. at 1243 (citing United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 425 (9th Cir. 1994)). In
Ayala, the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]o avoid being ‘found in’ the United States, a deported
alien can either not re-enter the United States or, if he has already re-entered the United
States, he can leave.” Ayala, 35 F.3d at 425.
232. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1243.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 1244.
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2. The Second Circuit: Continuous Presence As Legal Fiction
In United States v. Macias, the Second Circuit rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s continuous presence theory, calling it a legal fiction and refusing
to apply it to the similar set of facts.235 Departing from the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz, the Second Circuit held
that Macias was not present in the United States while he was physically on
Canadian soil attempting to seek admission into Canada, and that when
Macias physically crossed the border into Canada, “he had neither a legal
nor a physical presence in the United States.”236 The Second Circuit
recognized this explicit departure from the Ninth Circuit’s stance, stating,
“under similar circumstances the Ninth Circuit has twice held that the aliens
were ‘found in’ the United States pursuant to a theory that employed a legal
fiction of their continuous presence in the United States after having
crossed into Canadian territory.”237
In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s theory of continuous presence, the Second
Circuit pointed out that by concluding that Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz
never “legally left” the United States or “legally entered” Canada, the Ninth
Circuit assumed that Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz were either legally present
in the United States or Canada, neither of which the Second Circuit found
to be true in these cases.238 The Second Circuit then noted that nothing in
the Ninth Circuit cases (or any other “found in” cases) suggested that an
alien who is denied entry into another country is still considered “present”
in their country of origin—just because Macias was denied entry into
Canada does not mean he was still present in the United States, his “country
of origin” here.239
To support this point, the Second Circuit turned to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,240 where the Court
held that persons denied entry into the United States might also not be
present in any other country.241 In Mezei, a once lawful resident-alien of
the United States was denied reentry into the country at Ellis Island for
security reasons after returning from a trip to Hungary.242 Every country
that the United States consulted—including Hungary, France, the United
Kingdom, and about twelve Latin American countries—refused to take
Mezei back.243 Accordingly, the Court held that Mezei was neither present
in the United States—despite his physical detainment there—nor in

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99–100.
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
Macias, 740 F.3d at 100 (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209, 216).
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207–08.
Id. at 209.
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Hungary, France, the United Kingdom or any other country that refused to
take him back.244
The Second Circuit extended this principal to Macias: just because
Macias was denied entry into Canada does not mean he was still
“present”—albeit unlawfully—in the United States.245 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit concluded that Macias (and any other alien similarly
situated) was not “continuously present” in the United States after crossing
the Canadian border and hence, could not be convicted of being “found in”
the United States in violation of § 1326(a) on this ground.246
D. “Official Restraint” Analysis: Inapplicable or Applicable?
The second point of contention between the Ninth and Second Circuits is
whether an “official restraint” analysis is applicable to the facts on AmbrizAmbriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias, and accordingly, whether the “official
restraint” defense precludes them from receiving “found in” convictions.247
In Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz, the Ninth Circuit held that an
“official restraint” analysis was not applicable to the facts of these cases,248
while the Second Circuit held otherwise in Macias.249 Each circuit’s
answer to this question is partially predicated on its acceptance or rejection
of the “continuous presence” theory advanced by the Ninth Circuit in
Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz.250 This section first discusses the Ninth
Circuit’s rationale for holding that an “official restraint analysis” is not
applicable to the facts of the cases at issue, and then discusses the Second
Circuit’s contrary holding that an “official restraint” analysis is indeed
applicable and precludes these aliens from receiving “found in” convictions
under § 1326(a).
1. The Ninth Circuit: “Official Restraint” Analysis Inapplicable
In Ambriz-Ambriz, the Ninth Circuit held that Ambriz could not invoke
“official restraint” as a defense to his “found in” conviction for two reasons:
(1) he never “left” the United States; and (2) an “official restraint” analysis
was not applicable to Ambriz, as he was not “entering” into the United
States from a foreign country.251
As to the first point, the Ninth Circuit noted that invoking an “official
restraint” defense is only appropriate in situations where an alien is making
an entry into the United States.252 However, because Ambriz did not gain
244. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213,
215); Macias, 740 F.3d at 100.
245. See Macias, 740 F.3d at 99–100.
246. See id. at 102.
247. See infra Part II.D.1–2.
248. See United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d 1239, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719, 722–23 (9th Cir. 2009).
249. See Macias, 740 F.3d at 100.
250. See supra Part II.C.1.
251. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d at 722–23.
252. See id. at 723.
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legal entry into Canada, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Ambriz had never
“left” the United States in the first place and hence, was not making an
“entry” back into the United States after Canadian officials directed his car
back to the U.S. side of the border.253 Without Ambriz making this “entry,”
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that there was no need for “official restraint” to
enter into its “found in” analysis.254
The Ninth Circuit also explained that the alien must have been making
that entry into the United States from a foreign country in order for an
“official restraint” defense to apply.255 The court noted that because
Ambriz did not gain legal entry into Canada, he was not entering the United
States from a “foreign country” and thus, could not claim that he was under
“official restraint” after being forced to drive back across the U.S.
border.256 The court also noted that Ambriz’s brief physical presence in
Canada did not change this analysis, as the court found him to be
“continuously present” in the United States despite his physical presence on
Canadian soil.257
In Gonzalez-Diaz, the Ninth Circuit again relied on its earlier holding in
Ambriz-Ambriz to reach the conclusion that Gonzalez-Diaz was not entitled
to invoke an “official restraint” defense.258 As it did in Ambriz-Ambriz, the
Ninth Circuit held that because Gonzalez-Diaz did not gain legal entry into
Canada, he was not “entering” the United States from a foreign country—as
the “official restraint” defense requires—when Canadian border officials
drove him back across the border into the United States.259 As such, the
court concluded that an “official restraint” analysis was not applicable to
the facts of the case and therefore, Gonzalez-Diaz could not invoke an
“official restraint” defense to his “found in” conviction.260

253. See id. at 723–24.
254. See id.
255. Id. at 722–23.
256. See id. at 723.
257. See supra Part II.C.1.
258. See United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 2011). In
adhering to its holding in Ambriz-Ambriz, the Ninth Circuit noted, “Our conclusion is
dictated by United States v. Ambriz–Ambriz . . . . We rejected Ambriz’s argument, explaining
that the official restraint doctrine ‘pertains to an individual entering the United States from a
foreign country, and thus is inapplicable to Mr. Ambriz’s situation.’” Id. (quoting AmbrizAmbriz, 586 F.3d at 723).
259. Id. at 1244.
260. See id. It is worth noting that Gonzalez-Diaz tried to distinguish his case from
Ambriz-Ambriz by pointing out that while Ambriz was rejected at the border, Gonzalez-Diaz
spent a considerably longer time within Canadian territory. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit
found these factual differences to be immaterial, noting, “The Canadian border services
officers involved in Gonzalez-Diaz’s detention uniformly testified that he never gained legal
entry into Canada. The Entry for Further Examination form states that ‘[t]his authorization
to enter Canada does not confer status.’” Id. Therefore, because neither Ambriz nor
Gonzalez-Diaz gained legal status in Canada, the Ninth Circuit found the length of time
physically spent in Canada by Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz to be irrelevant to the “found in”
analysis. See id.
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2. The Second Circuit: “Official Restraint” Analysis Applicable
In Macias, the Second Circuit held that an “official restraint” analysis
was applicable to Macias’s immigration pattern—and by extension, to the
facts of Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz as well—and that, under such an
analysis, Macias had a legitimate “official restraint” defense that precluded
a “found in” conviction.261 This section first discusses why the Second
Circuit applied an “official restraint” analysis, and then discusses how the
“official restraint” defense precluded Macias (and would preclude similarly
situated aliens) from receiving a “found in” conviction.
a. An “Official Restraint” Analysis Is Applicable
The Second Circuit put forth two reasons why an “official restraint”
analysis was applicable to the facts of Macias.262 First, the Second Circuit
noted that in order for an alien’s “attempted entry” to become an “actual
entry” into the United States, the alien must be physically present in the
country as well as free from official restraint.263 Contrary to the Ninth
Circuit, the Second Circuit explicitly held that because aliens like Macias
were not “continuously present” in the United States while seeking entry
into Canada on Canadian soil, these aliens were indeed in the position of
making an entry back into the United States when they were forced to
return to the U.S. side of the border.264 Given these facts, the court held
that conducting an official restraint analysis was appropriate to the situation
at hand.265
Second, the Second Circuit questioned the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that
invoking an “official restraint” defense requires an alien to make an entry
into the United States from a foreign country.266 To this point, the Second
Circuit noted, “[n]either Gonzalez-Diaz nor Ambriz-Ambriz explains why
the logic of the official restraint doctrine, which distinguishes between
physical and legal presence, should not apply unless an alien is entering
from another country.”267
Moreover, the Second Circuit reasoned that even if entering from another
country was a requirement for an official restraint defense to apply, Macias
was “entering” the United States from another country.268 In reaching this
conclusion, the Second Circuit drew parallels between Macias and United
States v. 1903 Obscene Magazines,269 an earlier Second Circuit case

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 100–02 (2d Cir. 2014).
See infra Part II.D.2.a.
Macias, 740 F.3d at 100.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See Macias, 740 F.3d at 100.
Id. at 100 n.7.
Id.
See infra notes 269–74 and accompanying text.
907 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1990).
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dealing with the shipment of goods across the U.S.-Canadian border.270 In
Obscene Magazines, the Second Circuit held that goods rejected from
Canada nevertheless were considered to have entered into the United States
from a “foreign country,” regardless of the fact that they never gained legal
entry into Canada.271 In making this determination, the Second Circuit
noted, “[w]hether the magazines were accepted into Canada or denied entry
and held by Canadian Customs is irrelevant,”272 and that therefore, the
magazines were still entering the United States from Canada regardless of
their fate at the border.273 The Second Circuit reasoned that it was
appropriate to extend this logic to aliens attempting to reenter the United
States as well: regardless of their fate at the Canadian border, they should
still be considered to be entering the United States from Canada and hence,
from a foreign country.274 Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that
an “official restraint” analysis was applicable to the facts of Macias on
these grounds as well.275
b. The “Official Restraint” Defense Precludes Macias
from Receiving a “Found In” Conviction
After concluding that an “official restraint” analysis was applicable to the
facts of the case, the Second Circuit held that Macias was precluded from
receiving a “found in” conviction by invoking an “official restraint”
defense.276
In reaching this determination, the Second Circuit extended the “entry”
requirements—physical presence and freedom from official restraint277—to
a “found in” conviction, noting, “The same principles [applying to entry]
apply to being ‘found in’ the United States; if an alien’s presence here (after
she has left the country) is so attenuated that she has not yet ‘entered,’ then
it is insufficient to support ‘found in’ liability.”278 The court noted that
Macias was not free from official restraint when Canadian officials
delivered him to U.S. officials, because he was brought back over the
border involuntarily in handcuffs with “neither a desire to enter, nor a will
to be present in, the United States.”279 Therefore, the court concluded that
Macias did not make an “entry” into the United States because he was

270. Macias, 740 F.3d at 100–01. Before drawing this comparison, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the question of criminal liability for previously removed aliens moving
across the U.S.-Canadian border was one of first impression for the court. See id.
271. See Obscene Magazines, 907 F.2d at 1343 (“[G]oods rejected by the Customs
officials of a foreign country to which export is attempted are imported ‘from [that] foreign
country.’”).
272. Id. at 1342.
273. Id.
274. See Macias, 740 F.3d at 100–01.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 100–02.
277. Id. at 100.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 102.
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under “official restraint” and thus, could not be “found in” the United States
for purposes of § 1326(a).280
E. Policy Justifications
In addition to their differing legal conclusions, the Ninth and Second
Circuits also adopted differing policy justifications to arrive at their
inconsistent holdings.281 This section first discusses the Ninth Circuit’s
policy justifications in reaching its conclusion, and then discusses the
Second Circuit’s diverging policy justifications in reaching the opposite
conclusion.
1. Ninth Circuit Justifications
In Ambriz-Ambriz, the Ninth Circuit expressed a concern that if the court
did not convict Ambriz of being “found in” the United States, then the
government would have no way of punishing Ambriz for being illegally
present in the United States.282 In articulating this concern, the court
conceded that Ambriz was not “entering” or “attempting to enter” the
United States, because he had no “intent” to enter and because he was
already “in” the United States by virtue of his continuous presence in the
country throughout the entire ordeal.283 Accordingly, the court noted that
accepting Ambriz’s argument that he was not “found in” the United States
would lead to the “untenable result” that the government would have no
means to prosecute Ambriz under § 1326(a) for his unlawful reentry.284 As
such, the Ninth Circuit concluded that convicting Ambriz of being “found
in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a) was justified on these policy
grounds.285
2. Second Circuit Justifications
In Macias, the Second Circuit dispelled the Ninth Circuit’s concerns and
adopted its own policy justifications for holding that previously removed
aliens like Macias, Ambriz, and Gonzalez-Diaz should not be convicted of
being “found in” the United States in violation of § 1326(a).
In dismissing the Ninth Circuit’s concerns, the Second Circuit noted that
while Macias did break the laws of the United States by reentering the
country after his deportation in 2000, he was nonetheless not guilty of the

280. Id. The court also noted that “[a]liens attempting to enter the United States, stopped
in analogous circumstances, are not legally in the United States” to support the notion that
such aliens are under “official restraint” by way of continuous government surveillance
during these inspections. Id. at 99.
281. See infra Part II.E.1–2.
282. See United States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719, 723 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009).
283. Id. In order to be convicted of “entering” or “attempting to enter” the United States
in violation of § 1326(a), a previously removed alien must possess a “general intent” to make
(or attempt to make) an entry. See supra notes 65, 70.
284. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d at 723 n.3.
285. See id.
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crime of which he was convicted—being “found in” the United States.286
The court then noted that it was not troubled by the “seeming oddity,”
because Macias would still be subject to punishment in the form of removal
proceedings, despite the reversal of his criminal conviction.287 Therefore,
even though Macias could not be convicted under § 1326(a), he would still
be adequately punished for his unlawful reentry into the United States
following his initial removal in 2000.288
The Second Circuit also adopted its own policy justifications in arriving
at the conclusion that Macias was not “found in” the United States.289 The
court noted that it would be “anomalous” to criminally punish Macias with
potential prison time for being “found in” the United States based on his
attempt to stop living in the United States unlawfully, because doing so
would create a disincentive for undocumented, previously removed aliens
to do exactly what Congress would like them to do—leave the country.290
In light of this anomaly and the fact that Macias was “found in” the United
States against his will and desire to be present in the country,291 the Second
Circuit found Macias’s conviction to be “plainly erroneous” and that it
would constitute “manifest injustice” to allow Macias’s “found in”
conviction to stand.292
III. PRECEDENT, POLICY, AND CONSTRUCTION:
WHY THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPROACH SHOULD PREVAIL
This part argues that the federal courts should adopt the Second Circuit’s
position: previously removed aliens who surreptitiously reenter the United
States without permission, but remain undetected until they subsequently
attempt to leave the country and are involuntarily returned to the United
States by foreign officials, should not be considered “found in” the United
States in violation of § 1326(a). The Second Circuit offers a better legal
analysis that is consistent with major Supreme Court and circuit court
decisions that have shaped U.S. immigration law since the early 1900s.293
This resolution of the legal issue is also better policy because it encourages
illegal aliens to leave the United States—which is exactly what Congress
wants them to do—without the fear of receiving prison time if their attempt
to leave is ultimately unsuccessful.294
Part III.A agrees with the Second Circuit’s position that the Ninth
Circuit’s construction of “continuous presence” in the cases is a legal
286. United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2014).
287. Id. In making this argument, the court acknowledged that one may be skeptical of
this punishment, as Macias had already been removed once and yet had unlawfully reentered
the country. Id. at 101 n.10. The court answered this concern by noting that “[Macias]’s
genuine attempt to leave might hint at his disinclination to return.” Id.
288. See id. at 101.
289. See id. at 98, 101–02.
290. Id. at 101.
291. Id. at 102.
292. Id. at 98.
293. See infra Part III.A–B.
294. See infra Part III.C.
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fiction and should not dictate the outcome of such cases. Part III.B argues
that an “official restraint” defense should be applicable to aliens under the
same circumstances as Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias, and that this
defense should preclude them from receiving “found in” convictions under
§ 1326(a).
Part III.C advances additional policy justifications for
concluding that previously removed aliens like Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and
Macias should not be convicted of being “found in” the United States in
violation of § 1326(a).
A. Continuous Presence: A Legal Fiction
This section puts forth three compelling reasons why the Ninth Circuit’s
“continuous presence” theory should be considered a legal fiction and,
therefore, rejected.
1. It Is Possible to Be “Stateless” for Immigration Purposes
In formulating its “continuous presence” theory, the Ninth Circuit relies
too heavily on the false proposition that a noncitizen must be lawfully or
unlawfully “present” (separate from being physically present) in some
Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz
country at all given times.295
demonstrate their reliance on this false proposition by holding that neither
Ambriz nor Gonzalez-Diaz “left” the United States because they never
gained legal entry into Canada.296 This holding ignores the Supreme Court
precedent in Mezei, which held that a noncitizen does not necessarily have
to be “present” in any country despite having a physical presence in a
definite location.297 Specifically, Mezei held that even though the
defendant was physically present in the United States, he did not maintain a
lawful or unlawful “presence” in any country: he was not “present” in
Hungary, where his trip began, nor in any other country he passed through
on his return journey to the United States.298 Thus, Mezei was stateless for
immigration purposes.299
The Second Circuit was correct to extend this principle to Macias by
holding that Macias was not still “present” in the United States after he was
denied legal entry into Canada while on Canadian soil.300 Thus, Macias
was also “stateless” for immigration purposes after he was denied entry into
Canada. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Mezei and does not rest on the false proposition that a noncitizen must

295. The Ninth Circuit also cited no authority to support its position that those denied
entry to a foreign country are still present in their countries of origin. See Macias, 740 F.3d
at 99–100.
296. See supra Part II.C.1.
297. Macias, 740 F.3d at 100 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 209, 216 (1953)).
298. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213,
215); Macias, 740 F.3d at 100.
299. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213.
300. See supra Part II.C.2.
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maintain either a lawful or unlawful presence in some country at all given
times.301
2. “Continuous Presence” Defies Common Sense
The Ninth Circuit’s “continuous presence” theory also defies common
sense. It is reasonable to conclude—as the Second Circuit did—that once a
previously removed alien physically leaves United States, that alien is no
longer present—either lawfully or unlawfully—in the country.302 To
illustrate this point, it is helpful to consider the following hypothetical: say,
for example, instead of driving his car across the border to Canada, Ambriz
snuck onto a ship, sailed across the Atlantic Ocean, and docked in Portugal.
At the port of entry in Portugal, Ambriz is subsequently denied entry into
the country. At that very moment, should Ambriz still be considered
“present” in the United States? One may fairly assume that most
individuals would likely say no, and this would be a reasonable conclusion.
Yet, employing its theory of “continuous presence,” the Ninth Circuit
would answer that question affirmatively. As set out above, this conclusion
runs contrary to how most individuals would logically view the situation.
Perhaps it was the close physical proximity between Canada and the United
States that led the Ninth Circuit to its initial conclusion—that Ambriz and
Gonzalez-Diaz were still “present” in the United States while they were
physically on Canadian soil attempting entry into Canada.303 But physical
proximity between countries should not matter; neighboring countries are
still different countries, and actual physical presence in one country
certainly should have an effect on one’s lawful or unlawful presence in
another country—as the Second Circuit held in Macias304—regardless of
how close those countries are on a map.
3. The Ninth Circuit Defied Its Own Precedent
Finally, the Ninth Circuit defied its own precedent in convicting Ambriz
and Gonzalez-Diaz of being “found in” the United States on the basis that
each was “continuously present” in the United States despite being
physically present in Canada.305 Prior to its decisions in Ambriz-Ambriz
and Gonzalez-Diaz, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Ayala306 that
previously removed aliens who surreptitiously reenter the United States and
remain undetected could avoid a “found in” conviction by leaving the
United States.307 Nothing in Ayala requires that a previously removed alien
301. See supra Part II.C.2.
302. See supra Part II.C.2.
303. See supra Part II.C.1.
304. See supra Part II.C.2; see also United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.
2014) (“Prior to this ‘discovery,’ [Macias] physically crossed the border from the United
States into Canada; at that point, he had neither a legal nor a physical presence in the United
States.”).
305. See supra Part II.C.1.
306. 35 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1994); see also supra note 231.
307. Ayala, 35 F.3d at 425; see also supra note 231.
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gain legal entry in another country in order to “leave” the United States.308
Such a requirement should not be implicitly read into the court’s holding.
Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias did just what the Ninth Circuit said
they needed to do to avoid a “found in” conviction—they left the United
States.309 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should not have convicted Ambriz
and Gonzalez-Diaz of being “found in” the United States in violation of
§ 1326(a) on fictitious “continuous presence” grounds.
B. An “Official Restraint” Analysis Is Applicable
This section argues that: (1) an “official restraint” analysis is applicable
to cases like Ambriz-Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias, and (2) invoking
an “official restraint” defense should preclude aliens in such cases from
receiving “found in” convictions under § 1326(a).
1. An “Official Restraint” Analysis Is Applicable to These Cases
There are two compelling reasons why an “official restraint” analysis
should be applicable to cases like Ambriz-Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and
Macias. First, it is well-settled among the circuit courts that invoking an
“official restraint” defense requires an alien to be in the position of making
an “entry” or “attempted entry” into the United States.310 For the reasons
stated in Part III.A, Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias should not have
been considered “continuously present” in the United States while they
were on Canadian soil attempting to enter into Canada.311 Accordingly,
each should be seen as being in the position of making an entry back into
the United States while Canadian border officials escorted them across the
border and delivered them to U.S. officials. As such, Ambriz, GonzalezDiaz, and Macias should be able to invoke an “official restraint” defense on
the grounds that they were each in the position of making an “entry” back
into the United States, as invoking an “official restraint” defense
requires.312
Second, in Ambriz-Ambriz and Gonzalez-Diaz, the Ninth Circuit held that
in order for an “official restraint” defense to apply, an alien must have been
entering the United States “from a foreign country;”313 however, as the
Second Circuit correctly noted in Macias, the Ninth Circuit pointed to no
authority to support this proposition.314 Additionally, neither the plain
language of § 1326(a) nor the major circuit court cases discussing “official
restraint” require that an alien be entering into the United States “from a

308. See Ayala, 35 F.3d at 423–26.
309. See supra Part II.A–C.
310. See supra Part I.C.3; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part III.A.
312. See supra Part I.C.3.
313. See United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 630 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719, 722–23 (9th Cir. 2009); see also supra Part II.D.1.
314. See United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 100 n.7 (2d Cir. 2014); see also supra Part
II.D.2.a.
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foreign country” for the “official restraint” defense to apply.315 Therefore,
the requirement should not be read into the defense.
However, even if the courts were to adopt this additional requirement, the
Second Circuit convincingly argued that previously removed aliens like
Macias should indeed be considered entering the United States “from a
foreign country” by way of comparison to its earlier holding in Obscene
Magazines.316 Although the Second Circuit held in Obscene Magazines
that goods rejected at the Canadian border were still considered to be
coming into the United States “from a foreign country”—regardless of the
fact that they never legally entered Canada317—it seems logical to extend
this reasoning to aliens crossing the border as well.318 At the very least, the
Second Circuit points to some authority to support its reasoning, unlike the
Ninth Circuit.319 For these additional reasons, previously removed aliens
like Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias should be able to invoke an
“official restraint” defense to their “found in” convictions.
2. The “Official Restraint” Defense Precludes
Such Aliens from Receiving “Found In” Convictions
Having argued above that an “official restraint” analysis should be
applicable to cases like Ambriz-Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias,320 this
Note next argues that invoking an “official restraint” defense should
preclude aliens in such cases from receiving “found in” convictions.321
a. Each Alien Was Under Continuous Government Surveillance
To be under “official restraint,” an alien must first be under continuous
governmental observation or surveillance from the moment that he or she
attempted to make an entry.322 In Ambriz-Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and
Macias, each alien was decidedly under such surveillance upon their
reentries into the United States after being denied entry into Canada:
Canadian border officials instructed Ambriz to turn his car around and recross the border into the United States, where he fell into the surveillance of
U.S. Border Patrol agents;323 the RMCP physically drove Gonzalez-Diaz
across the border into the United States and released him immediately into
the custody of U.S. officials;324 and finally, Canadian officials escorted

315. See supra Part I.C; see also Macias, 740 F.3d at 102 (“[N]othing in 8 U.S.C. § 1326
requires entry into the United States following legal presence in another country . . . .”).
316. See Macias, 740 F.3d at 100–01; see also supra Part II.D.2.a.
317. See United States v. 1903 Obscene Magazines, 907 F.2d 1338, 1340 (2d Cir. 1990);
see also supra Part II.D.2.a.
318. See supra Part II.D.2.a.
319. See supra Part II.D.2.a.
320. See supra Part III.B.1.
321. See infra Part III.B.2.a–b.
322. See United States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2000); see also
supra Part I.C.1.
323. See supra Part II.A.1.
324. See supra Part II.A.1.
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Macias in handcuffs across the border into the United States and into the
custody of USCBP officials.325 Accordingly, each alien defendant was
under continuous government surveillance as he reentered the United States
from Canada and thus, meets the first requirement for falling under “official
restraint.”
b. Each Alien Was Unable to Exercise His “Free Will” During Reentry
In addition to being under continuous government surveillance from the
moment they attempt to make an entry, aliens must also lack the ability to
exercise their “free will” during their reentries to fall under “official
restraint.”326 To exercise “free will,” an alien must fall out of sight of any
physical or electronic surveillance for a substantial amount of time, and
must be able to freely “mix” with the general population without the fear
that government officials are tracking his or her whereabouts after the alien
entered into the United States.327 Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias were
unable to exercise this free will: Ambriz neither slipped out of the
surveillance of officials nor freely mixed with the general population, as he
proceeded immediately to the Roosville Port of Entry on the U.S. side of
the border;328 and Gonzalez-Diaz and Macias were both physically
restrained by Canadian officials and thus, had no chance to either slip out of
surveillance or freely mix with the general population upon their
reentries.329 Accordingly, Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias all meet the
second requirement for falling under “official restraint.”
Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias—as well as aliens in similar
circumstances—should be considered under “official restraint” because
they meet both requirements of being under continuous government
surveillance and being unable to exercise their “free will” upon reentry into
the United States.330 Accordingly, they did not effectuate an “entry” into
the United States after their rejections at the Canadian border, because they
were not “free from official restraint” as is required to make an “entry” into
the country.331 Thus, because these aliens did not make an actual “entry”
into the United States, they cannot be convicted of being “found in” the
United States in violation of § 1326(a), as one must first make an “entry”
into the country before being subsequently “found in” the United States.332
For these reasons, the Second Circuit correctly held that Macias was
precluded from receiving a “found in” conviction by way of his “official
restraint” defense. Accordingly, other circuits should follow the Second
Circuit’s lead on this issue.

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.1.–2.
See supra Part III.B.2.
See Matter of Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 1973).
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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C. Policy Justifications for Adopting the Second Circuit Approach
In addition to the Second Circuit’s more sound legal reasoning, strong
policy reasons weigh in favor of adopting the Second Circuit’s approach.
This section proceeds by discussing three of these reasons: (1) punishment
and disincentive to leave; (2) economic efficiency; and (3) moral
prerogative.
1. Punishment and Disincentive to Leave
At first glance, the Ninth Circuit presented a legitimate concern that
failing to convict Ambriz of being “found in” the United States would result
in the government having no way of punishing Ambriz under § 1326(a) for
being illegally present in the United States.333 However, as the Second
Circuit correctly pointed out in Macias, this concern overlooks the fact that
Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias would still be subject to removal
proceedings even if they were not found to have violated any prong of
§ 1326(a).334 Removal from the United States is punishment in and of
itself,335 so while these aliens should not have to face prison time under
§ 1326(a), they will still face the potentially harsh consequences associated
with removal.336
Additionally, the Second Circuit persuasively argued that previously
removed aliens who return and remain undetected in the United States may
have no incentive to leave the country if they are aware of the prospect of
facing prison for failing to gain legal entry into another country.337 This
argument is both reasonable and logical; these aliens would likely choose to
remain living in the United States undetected rather than taking the risk of
leaving the United States and being “found in” the country. As the Second
Circuit also correctly noted, providing such aliens with this “disincentive to
leave” runs contrary to the very intent of Congress—to have these aliens
leave the country and cease living in the United States unlawfully.338
2. Economic Efficiency
As aliens like Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias will face the ample
punishment of removal regardless of any conviction under § 1326(a),339 one
must consider whether it is really necessary to imprison these aliens in the
United States before removing them from the country. If Congress’s goal is
for these aliens to leave the country—which is exactly what these aliens are
attempting to do—then why keep them imprisoned in the very country
333. See United States v. Ambriz-Ambriz, 586 F.3d 719, 723 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009).
334. See United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2014). These aliens will face
removal proceedings on the grounds that they are inadmissible to the United States. See
supra note 37.
335. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 593.
336. See id.
337. See Macias, 740 F.3d at 101.
338. See id.
339. See supra Part III.C.1.
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Congress wants them to leave? While imprisonment may deter these aliens
from reentering the country yet again after their removals, it also exhausts
the country’s economic resources by exacerbating the problem of
overcrowding in the U.S. prison system.340 In lieu of contributing to this
issue, courts should adopt the Second Circuit’s solution of refusing to
criminally convict aliens like Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias under
§ 1326(a) and should instead focus on expeditiously removing them from
the country.
3. Moral Prerogative
Lastly, subjecting these aliens to “found in” convictions under § 1326(a)
raises the question this Note began with: Should the United States
criminally sanction previously removed aliens for attempting to stop living
in the very country in which they are illegally present? While aliens like
Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias undoubtedly broke the laws of the
United States after their initial removals by surreptitiously reentering the
country, many other aliens have done likewise and currently remain in this
country, undetected, with no intention to leave. From a moral standpoint, is
it really wise for the government to spend time and resources prosecuting
aliens like Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias, who are at least attempting
to stop living in the country unlawfully? Perhaps the United States should
invest more time and resources in punishing aliens who are illegally living
in the country undetected with no intention of leaving or, alternatively, in
preventing these aliens from entering and reentering the United States in the
first place. Frankly, this is a task the country has failed to accomplish thus
far as evidenced by immigration trajectories of Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz,
Macias, and the thousands of previously removed aliens who illegally cross
the border into the United States each year.341
CONCLUSION
With the crime of illegal reentry of previously removed aliens on the
steady rise,342 it is imperative that immigration statutes relating to
punishing illegal reentrants—like § 1326(a)—are applied with consistency
and accuracy. As evidenced by the inconsistent decisions in AmbrizAmbriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias, the circuit courts are failing at this
task. The Ninth and Second Circuits have analyzed an analogous set of
facts under the “found in” clause of § 1326(a), and have arrived at
alarmingly opposite legal conclusions. Without a resolution to this circuit
split, previously removed aliens like Ambriz, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Macias
will receive different treatment under the “found in” clause of § 1326(a)

340. See America’s Overcrowded Prisons: One Nation, Behind Bars, ECONOMIST (Aug.
17, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21583680-eric-holders-ideas-lockingup-fewer-americans-are-welcome-do-not-go-far-enough-one.
341. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
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depending on the circuit in which they are present. In the already complex
system of U.S. immigration law, this result is not acceptable.
This Note argues that the circuit courts—or the Supreme Court, should it
decide to resolve this split—should reach the Second Circuit’s conclusion
that previously removed aliens who surreptitiously reenter the United States
without permission, but remain undetected until they subsequently attempt
to leave the country and are involuntarily returned by foreign officials,
should not be considered “found in” the United States in violation of
§ 1326(a). Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s contradictory conclusion—that such
aliens should be considered “found in” the United States—the Second
Circuit’s reasoning and outcome are consistent with major Supreme Court
and circuit court decisions that have shaped U.S. immigration law since the
beginning of the twentieth century.343 The Second Circuit’s conclusion is
also sound on policy grounds, because it encourages illegal aliens to leave
the United States—which is exactly what Congress would like them to do—
without the fear of receiving a criminal conviction if they are turned away
at another country’s border. In the context of the complicated web that is
U.S. immigration law, ensuring consistency and sound policy is crucial to
the fair resolution of these intricate and perplexing immigration
conundrums.

343. See supra Part III.A–B.

